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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
INC., a Maryland non-profit
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS
and J. WALKER,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
vs.
RON WHITEHEAD, TOM GODFREY,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN,
ROSELYN KIRK and DON HALE,
Members Salt Lake Council,

Case No. 920233

Defendants-Appellants.
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF UTAH FOUNDATION, INC,
STATEMENT OF AUTHORITY
This brief of the Amicus

Curiae,

American Civil Liberties

Union of Utah Foundation, Inc., is filed pursuant to Rule 25,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, by leave of the Court and by
consent of all parties.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES DISCUSSED
BY AMICUS CURIAE
Amicus

Curiae

will focus on whether the judgment by the

Third Judicial District Court granting the plaintiff7s Motion for
Summary Judgment and denying the defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment was proper in light of Article I, § 4 of the Utah
Constitution, which prohibits the application or appropriation of
public money for any religious exercise or worship.
1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Article I, § 4, Constitution of Utah states in full as
follows:
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The
state shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no
religious test shall be required as a qualification for
any office of public trust or for any vote at any
election; nor shall any person be incompetent as a
witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of church and
state, nor shall any church dominate the state or
interfere with its functions. No public money or
property shall be appropriated for or applied to any
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the
support of any ecclesiastical establishment. Property
qualifications shall not be required of any person
to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this
constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 26, 1991, the Society of Separationists,
Richard Andrews and J. Walker ("Appellees"), filed an action
against the Salt Lake City Council ("Appellants" or the
"Council"), seeking to enjoin Appellants from the practice of
opening their city council meetings with public prayer.
Appellees argued that public prayer at City Council meetings was
violative of Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution, which
prohibits expenditure of any public money for, or application of
public property to, any religious exercise or worship.

It is not

disputed by the parties that public money and property is
appropriated and applied to the City Council's practice of
prayer.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

The Third Judicial District Court granted summary judgment in
2

favor of Appellees, finding that Appellants' practice of prayer
at city council meetings was unconstitutional in violation of
Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
A Notice of Appeal was filed on May 1, 1992.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amicus

Curiae,

American Civil Liberties Union of Utah

Foundation, Inc., adopts the facts as set forth in appellees'
brief filed with this Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The Salt Lake City Council is not the State

Legislature.

A city council is not a branch of government co-

equal with the Legislature.

All actions of a City County are

subject to review for constitutionality and no special deference
is accorded to this subservient government entity.
II.

The intent of a constitutional provision is determined

by looking to the language of the provision.

If the language is

clear and unambiguous, resort to extrinsic evidence is not
appropriate.
III. The language of Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution
is clear, unambiguous and capable of "ready interpretation".
IV.

Prayer is an inherently religious exercise and by its

very nature and purpose is not secular activity.

The Utah

Constitution prohibits public money or support for the religious
exercise of prayer.
V.

In order to best assure that citizens are guaranteed

religious liberty and free exercise, the government must not
3

sponsor nor engage in religious exercise.

Where, as here, the

State endorses religion, supports the prayer exercise, and sets
policy as to prayer content, free exercise is threatened.
VI.

Government sponsorship of religion creates unavoidable

and unconstitutional divisiveness.

When the government takes a

position supporting religious belief non-adherents are made to
feel as outsiders, disenfranchised and isolated.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CITY COUNCIL IS NOT A CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT AND ITS ACTIONS ARE NOT ACCORDED ANY
SPECIAL DEFERENCE.

Appellant's treat the City Council as a co-equal branch of
government.1 This line of analysis is patently absurd.

Article

V of the Utah Constitution creates three separate, co-equal
branches of government, City Council's are not part of this
tripartite.

Moreover, Title 10 of the Utah Code makes clear that

municipalities are legislatively created political
subdivisions.2

The fact that a City Council may exercise some

legislative functions does not ipso

facto

elevate it's status

beyond what is plainly is, a political entity inferior to the
judiciary and certainly accountable to this Court.

The facially

unconstitutional resolution at issue before this Court regarding
the internal opening ceremony of the City Council is not entitled
1

Appellant's boldly invoke Marbury v. Madison,
for the
proposition that the acts of a City Council are beyond the reach of
this Court.
2

Section 10-1-201 of the Utah Code specifically creates
municipalities and specifies their status as political subdivisions
of the State of Utah. Utah Code § 10-1-201 (1992).
4

to any deference.
II.

IF THE LANGUAGE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
IS CLEAR THERE IS NO RESORT TO EXTRANEOUS
EVIDENCE.

Appellants correctly assert that the first rule of
constitutional construction is to ascertain the intent of those
who framed the constitutional provision.

Appellants rely on

numerous cases for this "first rule of constitutional
construction."

(Brief of Appellants', p. 15 & 21). However,

Appellants misstate the first principle of this rule, that intent
is first ascertained from the language of the constitutional
provision.

If the language is clear the inquiry ends.

A close

reading of the cases relied on by Appellants reveals that any
resort to extraneous evidence of intent is

appropriate only if

the language of the provision is ambiguous.

Appellants do not

acknowledge this well-settled maxim; rather, they insist that
looking at the clear language of the provision is but one "tool"
of many to be used in interpreting the constitutional provision.
This is not the law.

Extraneous evidence is only resorted to if

intent cannot be readily ascertained from the language used.

In

the cases relied on by appellants this principle is applied
correctly and the proper analysis employed.

However, Appellants

ignore this analysis, instead quoting selectively from their
authority.
For example, the City Council cites General
Thrifty,

Electric

v.

5 Utah 2d. 326, 301 P.2d. 741 (1956), for the

proposition that "the construction of the simple wording of a
5

Constitutional provision is subservient to [the framers'] intent.
. . . " (Brief of Appellant's p. 21). In fact, the Court in its
ultimate holding rejected this argument and instead held that
intent is to be determined first from the language and there is
no reason "to ignore or vary from the plain import of the words
of the Constitution, eventhough events may have occured which
Id.

probably not foreseen at the time the provision was adopted."
at 752.
In University

of Utah v. Board of Examiners,

4 Utah 2d. 408,

295 P. 2d 348 (1956), the Court stated that if there is no
ambiguity or uncertainty and if the provisions are crystal clear
then "extraneous or contemporaneous construction may not be
resorted to."

In In re:
441 v. Rogers,

Id.

at 3 61.

Initiative

Petition

No. 281, State

Question

No.

434 P.2d 941 (Okla. 1967), the Oklahoma Supreme

Court noted that "[i]ntent is to be found from the instrument
itself. . . . When the text is not ambiguous, the court is not
at liberty to search for meaning beyond the instrument."
943, (quoting Hines
also, Shaw v.

v. Winters,

Grumbie,

Id.

at

320 P.2d 1114 (Okla. 1957); see

278 P.2d 311 (Okla. 1929) ("To reach

meaning the first resort in all cases is to the natural
significance of the words.")

Thus, the first step in

constitutional or statutory interpretation is to give the words
their "natural, obvious and ordinary meaning."
v.

Southwest
In P.I.E.

Lumber Mills,
Emp. Fed.

County

of

Apache

376 P.2d 854 (Ariz. 1962).
Credit

Union v. Bass,
6

759 P.2d 1144

(Utah 1988), relied on by amicus

curiae

League of Cities and

Towns, this Court held as follows:
When the language of a particular provision of a
statute is ambiguous, the Court may attempt,
following principles of statutory construction,
to ascertain the intention of the Legislature;

but where there is no ambiguity the plain
language
of the statute
must
be
taken
as
the
expression
of
the [framerfs]
intent.
Id.

at 1151, emphasis added.
Appellants also misconstrue the essential holding of Rampton

v. Barlow,

464 P.2d 378 (Utah 1970).

Rampton stands for the

proposition that where the language is clear, practical
considerations, even those of long standing, cannot be
controlling.

Id.

at 382.

Appellants repeatedly deride and ridicule the District Court
for its reliance on the plain meaning of Article I, § 4.

Yet the

District Court was entirely correct in refusing to look past the
unambiguous language of Article I, § 4.

Appellants invitation to

this Court to second guess the intent of the framer's as embodied
in the language of Article I, § 4 should be declined.

III. THE LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE I, § 4 IS CLEAR AND
UNAMBIGUOUS.
Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution states in pertinent
part as follows:
The rights of conscience shall never be
infringed. The state shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof:
. . .There shall be no union of church and
state, nor shall any church dominate the
State or interfere with its functions.
7

No public money or property
appropriated
for or applied
religious
worship, exercise
or for the support of any
establishment.

shall be
to any
or
instruction,
ecclesiastical
3

. . .[emphasis added]

The District Court found this language "unambiguous and
capable of ready interpretation.11

(Memorandum Decision, p. 12

attached as Appendix B). According to the District Court, the
language of Article I, § 4 is an "unequivocal, unconditional
pronouncement", which leaves "little room for clarification and
interpretation."

N

Id.

Appellants attempt to manufacture an ambiguity by comparing
the Article I, § 4 with the Utah Constitution Preamble.

The

Preamble begins, "Grateful to Almighty God". . . . Appellants
argue that this simple declaration is inconsistent with the plain
language of Article I, § 4.

This position mocks the Framers.

First, until this Court definitively states otherwise, the
Preamble is not construed as law and is of no practical effect.4
Second, the Preamble is not religious exercise, worship or
instruction, and therefore no inconsistency exists.

A mere

reference to a Deity is not reasonably characterized as prayer.
Appellants consistently fail to acknowledge the distinction
between the clearly religious exercise of prayer and the non-

3

This provision is not unique. Some 45 states have
constitutional provisions, which expand on the cryptic language
of the First Amendment. Many of these provisions also prohibit
the expenditure of public funds for any religious worship or
exercise. See Appendix A.
4

See e.g.,

Webster v. Reproductive

3040, 3050 (1989).
8

Health Services,

109 S.Ct.

religious exercises of singing patriotic songs, reciting of the
Pledge of Allegiance, or imprinting currency with the words "In
God We Trust".

This Court should not countenance Appellants'

attempts to create false issues of constitutional conflict and
ambiguity.

IV.
A.

PRAYER IS A RELIGIOUS EXERCISE.

Appellants' Insistence That Prayer Is Secular Is
Unpersuasive.

Prayer is, by any objective standard, a religious exercise.
The definitive purpose of prayer is to invoke divine guidance or
to address God, Marsh v. Chambers,

463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).

The

Council's prayer "guidelines" assert that their prayers have only
a secular purpose.

Such self-serving assertions belie the

teaching and experience of thoughtful citizens.
Prayer is perhaps the quintessential religious
practice for many of the world's faiths and
plays a significant role in the devotional
lives of most religious people . . . . Prayer
is an address of entreaty, supplication, praise
or thanksgiving directed to some sacred or
divine spirit, being or object. That it may
contemplate some wholly secular objective
cannot alter the inherently religious character
of the exercise.
Karen B. v. Trenn,

653 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd mem.,

455 U.S. 913 (1982).5
5

See also, Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1020 (4th Cir.
1980), ("A prayer . . . is undeniably religious and has, by its
nature both a religious purpose and effect"); Graham v.
Central
Community School Dist.,
608 F. Supp. 531, 535 (S.D. Iowa 1986),
(It is "the undeniable truth that prayer is inherently
religious"); Kay v. David Douglas School District,
719 P.2d 875,
9

Even granting that a secular purpose is present; for
example, "to provide a moment during which the Council Members
and the audience can reflect on the importance of the business
before the Council" . . . (Attachment "1", Brief of Appellants),
the Council still cannot use religious means to achieve secular
ends.

"The unmistakable message of the Supreme Court's teachings

is that the State cannot employ a religious means to serve an
otherwise legitimate secular interest."

Karen B.,

653 F.2d at

901.

B.

The Utah Constitution Prohibits the Application Or
Appropriation of Public Money to Support The Council's
Sponsoring of Prayer.

It is conceded by Appellants that public money is
appropriated and applied to the support of prayer at city council
meetings.

Because prayer is a religious exercise, the City

Council practice violates the clear prohibition stated in Article
I, § 4.
This Court has interpreted Article I, § 4.

In each case,

this Court found the challenged action could not properly be
categorized as religious exercise, worship or instruction.6
879-80 (Or. App. 1985), ("It would be a contradiction in terms
to say that the giving of a prayer has no religious purpose");
Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014, slip op. (U.S. Sup. Ct. June 24,
1992) , (prayer treated as a religious exercise).
6

In Gubler v. Utah State Teachers Retirement
Board, 113 Utah
188, 192 P.2d 580 (1948), the Utah Supreme Court held that a state
law which permitted public school teachers to receive retirement
credit in the state retirement system for years which they had
spent teaching in parochial schools was not prohibited by Article
I, § 4. The Court specifically found that "no public money or
10

Article I, § 4 prohibits the application or appropriation of
public money to "religious worship, exercise or instruction."
Thus, if and only if a challenged action is religious worship,
exercise or instruction is it violative of the Utah
Constitution.7
It has been noted that the Utah provision is virtually
identical to a provision of the Washington Constitution.

While

the Washington Supreme Court has not had occasion to address the
constitutionality of city council prayer, that Court has
previously interpreted its constitutional counterpart to Utah's
property has been appropriated or is being applied to any religious
worship, exercise, or instruction." Id. at 587.
In Thomas

v.

Daughters

of Utah Pioneers,

114 Utah 108, 197 P. 2d 477

(1948) , the Court held that the construction of the Daughters of
Utah Pioneers museum with state funds did not violate Article I, §
4. Again, the Court asked whether the construction of the museum
would amount to religious exercise, worship or instruction. The
Court found no evidence of any such action and determined that
before it could find a violation of the Utah Constitution, it would
need to find "proof of overt acts of proselytizing. Id. at 489.
Finally, in Manning v. Sevier County, 3 0 Utah 2d 3 05, 517 P. 2d 549
(1973) , the Court upheld the use of public funds to construct a
hospital which was to be leased and operated by a church-held
corporation. Once again, the Court held there was no violation of
Article I, § 4 because there would be no religious rooms, no
religious symbols, no reference to any religious denomination, no
proselytizing, nor any other activities that could be characterized
as religious exercise, worship or instruction.
7

Appellants conjecture here, as they did below, a number of
scenarios to incite conflict and hysteria. Appellants fail to
acknowledge the limiting language of Article I, § 4. A challenged
practice will be vulnerable to attack only if public money or
property is appropriated or applied and the action is legitimately
characterized as religious worship, exercise or instruction.
Moreover, both the First Amendment and Article I, § 4 protect
private citizens in the Free Exercise of their religious beliefs.
(See infra
Section IV).
Non-government supported religious
exercise is not at issue here.
11

Article I, § 4.8
In each instance, the Washington Supreme Court engaged in
the very analysis as our District Court below.

The Court looked

first to whether public money was spent and second to whether the
challenged practice was religious exercise, worship or
instruction.
In State

ex.

rel.

Dearie

v. Frasier,

102 Wash. 369, 173 P.

35 (1918), the Washington Court struck down a school board
resolution giving high school credits for Bible study done
outside of school.

The Court reached this decision based on its

view that the Bible study was religious instruction for which
public money was allocated or appropriated and therefore
prohibited by the Washington Constitution.
In Calvary

Bible

Presbyterian

Church v. Board of Regents,

72

Wash. 2d. 912, 436 P.2d. 189 (1967), cert, denied 393 U.S. 96,

d

Washington Constitution Article I, § 11 states:

"Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious
sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every
individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person
or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
and safety of the state. No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment:
Provided, however, that this article shall be not so construed as
to forbid the employment by the state of a chaplain for such of
the state custodial, correctional and mental institutions as in
the discretion of the legislature may seem justified. No
religious qualification shall be required for any public office
or employment, nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness
or juror, in consequence of this opinion on matters of religion,
nor be questioned in any court of justice touching his religious
belief to affect the weight of his testimony."
12

(1968), the Washington Court found that an elective university
course, "English 390: The Bible as Literature", did not violate
the Washington Constitutional provision.

The court in

Calvary

found that the testimony and evidence demonstrated that the
course did not amount to religious instruction.
"We find that English 390 was taught in a
completely objective manner; had no effect
on religious beliefs; was not slanted toward
any particular theological or religious
point of view; did not indoctrinate anyone;
did not enter into the realm of belief or
faith; and was not taught from a religious
point of view."

Id.

at 194. In Witters

Blind,

v. State

of Washington Commission for

the

111 P.2d. 1119 (Wash. 1989), the court held that the

appropriation or allocation of rehabilitation funds to finance
the education of a blind student at a religious institution
designed to prepare him for a career as a pastor was a violation
of the Washington State Constitution.

The court found that the

student sought funds for what was undeniably religious
instruction.9
In each of the Utah and Washington cases, the Court found a
violation of the relevant constitutional provisions if the
activity engaged in by the State in supported of religion
generally or supported religious beliefs as against disbelief.
If the effect, or purpose, or intent of the State's activity is

In none of the cases interpreting Article I, § 4 or the
Washington provision did the Court look behind the language of
their respective provisions. Obviously the Court viewed the
language as self-evident of the Framers intent.
13

to promote or favor religion, there is a violation of the
constitutional provision.

V.

THE GUARANTEE OF FREE EXERCISE IS BEST
PROTECTED WHEN GOVERNMENT DISPLAYS
FIDELITY TO ITS SECULAR PURPOSE AND
FUNCTION.

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides for
two distinct religious guarantees, freedom to engage in the free
exercise of religion and freedom from government establishment of
religion.10
These "clauses exist to protect religion from government
interference."

Lee v. Weisman,

Sup. Ct. June 24, 1992).

No. 90-1014, slip op. at 10 (U.S.

According to Lee "the First Amendment's

religion clauses, mean that religious beliefs are too precious to
be either proscribed or prescribed by the State." Xd.

In Lee,

the challenged practice was school graduation prayer.

In holding

that such prayers violated the First Amendment, the Court
undertook a thoughtful analysis of the religion clauses which
applies equally here.
It appears lost on Appellants that the precious freedom to
engage in religious exercise is threatened when government
assumes a central role in that exercise.

"A State created

orthodox, puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and
conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is

10

Of course the language of the First Amendment is codified
in Article I, § 4, thus U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of the
First Amendment guarantees in instructive.
14

real, not imposed."

Id.

at 12.

According to Lee:
The First Amendment protects speech and religion by
quite different mechanisms. Speech is protected by
insuring its full expression even when the government
participates, for the very object of some of our most
important speech is to persuade the government to adopt
an idea as it's own. The method for protecting freedom
of worship and freedom of conscience in religious
matters is quite the reverse. In religious debate or
expression, the government is not a prime participant,
for the Framers deemed religious establishment
antithetical to the freedom of all. The Free Exercise
Clause embraces a freedom conscience and worship that
has close parallels in the speech provisions of the
First Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a
specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in
religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the
speech provisions. The explanation lies in the lesson
of history that was and is the inspiration for the
Establishment Clause, the lesson that in the hands of
government what might begin as a tolerant expression of
religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and
coerce.
Id.

Citations omitted.
Few scenarios of state-sponsored religious exercise could be

more violative of the principles espoused above then the City
Council prayer at issue here.
One timeless lesson is that if citizens are subjected to
State-sponsored religious exercises, the State disavows it's
own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable
conscience and belief which is the mark of free people. To
compromise that principle today, would be to deny our own
tradition and forfeit our standing to urge others to secure
the protections of that tradition for themselves. Id. at
12-13.
The record here reveals not only State support for and
sponsorship of prayer, but attempts by the State to proscribe the
content of the prayers through official policy.
Appellant's, Attachment 1).
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(Brief of

The City Council has argued that their prayer policy is
intended to include "all points of view", "a wide variety of
prayers" and "diversity."

(Brief of Appellant's p. 7, f10).

This goal only furthers state involvement with impermissible
religious activity:

"Nor does it solve the problem to say that

the State should promote a 'diversity' of religious views; that
position would necessarily compel the government and, inevitably,
the Courts to make wholly inappropriate judgments about the
number of religions the State should sponsor and the relative
frequency with which it should sponsor each."

Jd. at 9 (Souter,

JJ., concurring).
In short, the government must remain neutral in matters of
religion.

The province of government is to govern.

Fortunately,

government also has the right and duty to protect the free
exercise of its citizens.
Exercise Clause.

That is the promise of the Free

The State can and should accommodate the free

exercise of religion "by relieving people from generally
applicable rules that interfere with their religious
callings."11

Jd. at 19 (Souter, JJ., concurring).

11

See e.g. Sherbert
v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Where
Court held that a state's denial of unemployment insurance benefits
to Appellant based on her refusal to work on Saturday due to her
religious beliefs was "unconstitutional denial of Appellants free
exercise); West Virginia
State Board of Education
v. Barnett,
319
U.S. 624 (1943) (Where Court held that a Board of Education
Resolution ordering the Pledge of Allegiance become a regular part
of the program of activities) in the public schools was an
unconstitutional infringement on free exercise of Jehovah's
Witnesses); Girouard v. United States,
328 U.S. 61 (1946) (Where
Court held that religious pacifists were eligible for citizenship
in the United States and would not be required to take the usual
oath to bear arms); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Where
16

Accommodation is not unlimited.

The appropriate scope is

defined by the requirement that any accommodation must "lift a
discernible burden on the free exercise of religion."
Weisman,

at 21 (Souter JJ., concurring).

Lee

v.

"Concern for the

position of religious individuals in the modern regulatory State,
cannot justify official solicitude for a religious practice
unburdened by general rules; such gratuitous largesse would
effectively favor religion over disbelief." Id.

Justice Souter

then counters an argument apparently made with a straight face by
Appellants:

that omitting prayers would violate the free speech

rights of City Council Members.

(Brief of Appellant's p. 17).

To paraphrase Justice Souter: "[religious City Council members]
cannot complain that omitting prayers from their [City Council
meeting] would, in any realistic sense, "burden" their spiritual
callings.

To be sure, many of them invest the [meeting] with

spiritual significance, but they may express their religious
feelings about it before and after the [meeting].

They may even

organize a privately sponsored [prayer] if they desire the
company of like minded [City Council members].

Id.

at 21-22.

Essentially, what Appellants seek is protection for impermissible
religious exercise which otherwise is wholly available to them
without government interference or proscription.
merely accommodation but sponsorship.

This is not

"Because they accordingly

have no need for the machinery of the State to affirm their

Court held that the state could not compel attendance at public
secondary schools of Amish children).
17

beliefs, the government sponsorship of prayer . . is most
reasonably understood as an official endorsement of religion and,
in this instance, of theistic religion.11

Id.

The significant

distinction between endorsement and accommodation must be honored
by the City Council.

The City Council has an obligation to

uphold the guarantee of religious liberty which requires the
Council not to intrude into matters of religion.
The distinct guarantees embodied in the First Amendment and
in Article I, § 4 will, "through vigorous enforcement 'promote
and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and
tolerance for all and . . . nurture the conditions which secure
the best hope of attainment of that end.'"
J., concurring) quoting Abington

School

Id.

District

at 7 (Blackmun,
v. Schempp,

374

U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).

VI.

GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PRAYER CREATES
UNAVOIDABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DIVISIVENESS AND ISOLATION.

City Council prayer has generated much public
discussion.12

"Numerous letters to the Editor and Editorials

have appeared in newspapers throughout the State.

The Utah State

Legislature has created the Religious Liberty Committee whose
express purpose is to consider the amending of Article I, § 4 and
possibly delete the religious liberty protections contained
therein.

Eminent Constitutional scholars warn of the

12

Amici
respectfully suggests that the
judicial notice of this fact.
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Court can take

divisiveness generated by this issue.
The U.S. Supreme Court has often recognized the sensitive
and divisive nature of government involvement in religion.

The

Court has repeatedly noted that the First Amendment "at the very
least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community.'" County

of Allegheny

v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct.

3086, 3101 (1989), quoting Lynch v. Donnelly,

465 U.S. 668, 687

(1984) .
When the very governmental body from which a citizen seeks
advice or redress sponsors religious activity contrary to his or
her beliefs, the government diminishes that citizen's status. As
Justice O'Connor notes, "[ejndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community."
465 U.S. at 688. See also

Wallace

v. Jaffree,

Lynch,

472 U.S. 38 (1985)

("the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends
beyond intolerance among Christian sects—or even intolerance
among 'religions'—to encompass intolerance of the disbeliever
and the uncertain".);

Torasco

v. Watkins,

367 U.S. 488, 495

(1961) (the state may not pass laws that "aid all religions
against non-believers");

Texas Monthly,

13

Inc.

v. Bullock,

109 S.

Alfred C. Emery and John J. Flynn, Rush To Amend Utah
Constitution Invites Divisive Religious Assault, Salt Lake Tribune,
May 11, 1991 at A9, attached as Appendix C.
19

Ct. 890,896 (1989) ("the Constitution prohibits, at the very
least, legislation that constitutes an endorsement of one or
another set of religious beliefs or of religion generally.")
The above analysis is apt in this context.
meeting is a intimate forum.

A City Council

Citizens address directly their

elected representatives, air grievances or request consideration
or redress.

There is an immediacy absent from other legislative

settings.14

The Court's instructions are clear:

government

action which has the effect of penalizing of favoring religious
belief is unconstitutional.
prayer.

That is the effect of City Council

This effect coupled with the expansive prohibitory

language of Article I, § 4 demonstrate the rightness of the
District Court's ruling.
CONCLUSION
The language of Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution is
straightforward.

In the face of clear constitutional language,

this Court is not at liberty to surmise an intent contrary to
that language.

The sole issue before this Court is the

constitutionality under Article I, § 4 of City Council prayer
exercises.

Historically, government involvement or sponsorship

of religious activity has engendered divisiveness and intolerance
of those who object.

This case aptly demonstrates that reality.

14

While the issue is not directly before this Court Amici
notes that City Council prayer is not akin to the opening prayers
of state legislatures found constitutional under Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
This position is supported by the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision Lee v. Weisman, No. 90-1014, slip op.
(U.S. Sup. Ct. June 24, 1992).
In Lee the Court explicitly
restricted Marsh to "state legislative bodies." Id. at 17.
20

The religious liberty of the citizens of Utah is best protected
when government strictly maintains its secular function.

Each

citizen is entitled to full and free exercise of his or her
religious beliefs without government approval or disdain.

The

decision of the Third Judicial District Court was correct, in
accordance with settled principles of constitutional
construction, and serves the best interests of all citizens.

The

decision of the District Court should be affirmed.
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APPENDIX A

Relevant portions of other State Constitutions:

The portion of each state constitution that parallels
Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution provides:
1.

"That no religion shall be established by law; that no

preference shall be given by law to any religious sect, society,
denomination, or mode or worship; that no one shall be compelled
by law to attend any place of worship; nor to pay any tithes,
taxes, or other rate for building or repairing any place of
worship, or for maintaining any minister or ministry; that no
religious test shall be required as a qualification to any office
or public trust under this state; and that the civil rights,
privileges, and capacities of any citizen shall not be in any
manner affected by his religious principles."

ALA. CONST. Art.

1/ § 3.
2.

"The liberty of conscience secured by the provisions of

this Constitution shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
and safety of the State. No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise,
or instruction, or to the support of any religious establishment.
No religious qualification shall be required for any public
office or employment, nor shall any person be incompetent as a
witness or juror in consequence of his opinion on matters of
religion, nor be questioned touching his religious belief in any

court of justice to affect the weight of his testimony."

ARIZ.

CONST. Art. II, § 12, Art. IX, § 10.
3.

"Religious liberty.—All men have a natural and

indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own consciences; no man can, of right, be
compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship; or to
maintain any ministry against his consent.

No human authority

can, in any case or manner whatsoever, control or interfere with
the right of conscience; and no preference shall ever be given,
by law, to any religious establishment, denomination or mode of
worship above any other.
Protection of religion.—Religion, morality and knowledge
being essential to good government, the General Assembly shall
enact suitable laws to protect every religious denomination in
the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public worship.
Religious test.—No religious test shall ever be required of
any person as a qualification to vote or hold office, nor shall
any person be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of
his religious belief; but nothing herein shall be construed to
dispense with oaths or affirmations."

ARK. CONST. Art. II, §§

24-26.
4.

"Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without

discrimination or preference are guaranteed.

This liberty of

conscience does not excuse acts that are licentious or
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State.

The

Legislature shall make no law respecting an establishment of
2

religion.
A person is not incompetent to be a witness or juror because
of his or her opinions on religious beliefs. (New section adopted
November 5, 1974.)"
5.

CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 4.

"Religious freedom.

The free exercise and enjoyment of

religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall
forever hereafter be guaranteed; and no person shall be denied
any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, on account
of his opinions concerning religion; but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense with
oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness or justify
practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of
the state.

No person shall be required to attend or support any

ministry or place worship, religious sect or denomination against
his consent.

Nor shall any preference be given by law to any

religious denomination or mode of worship."

COLO. CONST. Art.

II, § 4.
6.

"The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and

worship, without discrimination, shall forever be free to all
persons in the state; provided, that the right hereby declared
and established, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness, or to justify practices inconsistent with the
peace and safety of the state."
7.

CONN. CONST. Art. VII, § 8.

"Although it is the duty of all men frequently to

assemble together for the public worship of Almighty God; and
piety and morality, on which the prosperity of communities
3

depends, are hereby promoted; yet no man shall or ought to be
compelled to attend any religious worship, to contribute to the
erection or support of any place of worship, or to the
maintenance of any ministry, against his own free will and
consent; and no power shall or ought to be vested in or assumed
by any magistrate that shall in any case interfere with, or in
any manner control the rights of conscience, in the free exercise
of religious worship, nor a preference given by law to any
religious societies, denominations, or modes of worship."

DEL.

CONST. Art. I, § 1.
8.

"Religious freedom.-There shall be no law respecting the

establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free
exercise thereof.

Religious freedom shall not justify practices

inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.

No revenue of

the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall
ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in
aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of
any sectarian institution."
9.

FLA. CONST. Art. I, § 3.

"Freedom of conscience.

Each person has the natural and

inalienable right to worship God, each according to the dictates
of that person's own conscience, and no human authority should,
in any case, control or interfere with such right of conscience.
Religious opinions; freedom of religion.

No inhabitant of

his state shall be molested in person or property or be
prohibited from holding any public office or trust on account of
religious opinions; but the right of freedom of religion shall
4

not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the
state."

GA. CONST. Art. I, § 2.

10. "No law shall be enacted respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging
the freedom of speech or of the press or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances."

HAW. CONST. Art. I, § 4.

11. "Guaranty of religious liberty.

The exercise and

enjoyment of religious faith and worship shall forever be
guaranteed; and no person shall be denied any civil or political
right, privilege, or capacity on account of his religious
opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not
be construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations, or excuse
acts of licentiousness or justify polygamous or other pernicious
practices, inconsistent with morality or the peace or safety of
the state; nor to permit any person, organization, or association
to directly or indirectly aid or abet, counsel or advise any
person to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy, or any other
crime.

No person shall be required to attend or support any

ministry or place of worship, religious sect or denomination, or
pay tithes against his consent; nor shall any preference be given
by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship.

Bigamy

and polygamy are forever prohibited in the state, and the
legislature shall provide by law for the punishment of such
crimes."

IDAHO CONST. Art. IX, § 5.
5

12. "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship without discrimination, shall forever be guaranteed,
and no person shall be denied any civil or political right,
privilege or capacity, on account of his religious opinions; but
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed
to dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
or safety of the State. No person shall be required to attend or
support any ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor
shall any preference be given by law to any religious
denomination or mode of worship."

ILL. CONST. Art. I, § 3.

13. "Right to worship.-All people shall be secured in their
natural right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates
of their own consciences.

[As amended November 7, 1984.]

Freedom of thought.-No law shall, in any case whatever,
control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or
interfere with the rights of conscience.
No preference to any creed.-No preference shall be given, by
law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of worship; and no
person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place
of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent. [As
amended November 7, 1984.]
No religious test for office.-No religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of trust or profit.
No money for religious institutions.-No money shall be drawn
from the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or
6

theological institution.
Competency of witness.-No person shall be rendered
incompetent as a witness, in consequence of his opinions on
matters of religion."

IND. CONST. Art. I, §§ 2-7.

14. "No religious test shall be required as a qualification
for any office, or public trust, and no person shall be deprived
of any of his rights, privileges, or capacities, or disqualified
from the performance of any of his public or private duties, or
rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or
equity, in consequence of his opinions on the subject of
religion; and any party to any judicial proceeding shall have the
right to use as a witness, or take the testimony of, any other
person not disqualified on account of interest who may be
cognizant of any fact material to the case; and parties to suits
may be witnesses, as provided by law."
15. "Religious liberty.

IOWA CONST. Art. I, § 4.

The right to worship God according

to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall
any person be compelled to attend or support any form of worship;
nor shall any control of or interference with the rights of
conscience be permitted, nor any preference be given by law to
any religious establishment or mode of worship.

No religious

test or property qualification shall be required for any office
of public trust, nor for any vote at any election, nor shall any
person be incompetent to testify on account of religious belief."
KAN. CONST. Art. § 7.
16. "Right of religious freedom.
7

No preference shall ever

be given by law to any religious sect, society or denomination;
nor to any particular creed, mode of worship or system of
ecclesiastical polity; nor shall any person be compelled to
attend any place of worship, to contribute to the erection or
maintenance of any such place, or to the salary or support of any
minister of religion; nor shall any man be compelled to send his
child to any school to which he may be conscientiously opposed;
and the civil rights, privileges or capacities of no person shall
be taken away, or in anyway diminished or enlarged, on account of
his belief or disbelief of any religious tenet, dogma or
teaching.

No human authority shall, in any case whatever,

control or interfere with the rights of conscience."

KY. CONST.

§ 5.
17. "Religious freedom:

sects equal; religious tests

prohibited; religious teachers. All individuals have a natural
and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own consciences, and no person shall be hurt,
molested or restrained in that persons liberty or estate for
worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the
dictates of that person7s own conscience, nor for that person7s
religious professions or sentiments, provided that a person does
not disturb the public peace, nor obstruct others in their
religious worship;-and all persons demeaning themselves
peaceably, as good members of the State, shall be equally under
the protection of the laws, and no subordination nor preference
of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be
8

established by law, nor shall any religious test be required as a
qualification for any office or trust, under this State; and all
religious societies in this State, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, shall at all times have the exclusive right of
electing their public teachers, and contracting with them for
their support and maintenance."

ME. CONST. Art. I, § 3.

18. "That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in
such manner as he thinks most acceptable to Him, all persons are
equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty;
wherefore, no person ought by any law to be molested in his
person or estate, on account of his religious persuasion, or
profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under the
color of religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace or
safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or
injure others in their natural, civil or religious rights; nor
ought any person to be compelled to frequent, or maintain, or
contribute, unless on contract, to maintain, any place of
worship, or any ministry; nor shall any person, otherwise
competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness, or juror, on
account of his religious belief, provided, he believes in the
existence of God, and that under His dispensation such person
will be held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded or
punished therefor either in this world or in the world to come.
Nothing shall prohibit or require the making reference to
belief in, reliance upon, or invoking the aid of God or a Supreme
Being in any governmental or public document, proceeding,
9

activity, ceremony, school, institution, or place•
Nothing in this article shall constitute an establishment of
religion, (1970, ch. 558, ratified Nov. 3, 1970.).
That no religious test ought ever to be required as a
qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State,
other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God; nor
shall the Legislature prescribe any other oath of office than the
oath prescribed by this Constitution."

MD. CONST, Art. 3 6-37.

19. "It is the right as well as the Duty of all men in
society, publicly, and as stated seasons to worship the Supreme
Being, the great Creator and preserver of the Universe.

An no

Subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person,
Liberty, or Estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and season
most agreeable to the Dictates of his own conscience, or for his
religious profession or sentiments; provided he doth not Disturb
the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious Worship."
MASS. CONST. Art. 46, § 2.
20. "Every person shall be at liberty to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience.

No person shall

be compelled to attend, or, against his consent, to contribute to
the erection or support of any place of religious worship, or to
pay tithes, taxes or other rates for the support of any minister
of the gospel or teacher of religion.

No money shall be

appropriated or drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any
religious sect or society, theological or religious seminary; nor
shall property belonging to the state be appropriated for any
10

such purpose.

The civil and political rights, privileges and

capacities of no person shall be diminished or enlarged on
account of his religious belief."

MICH. CONST. Art. I, § 4.

21. "Freedom of conscience; no preference to be given to any
religious establishment or mode of worship.

The enumeration of

rights in this constitution shall not deny or impair others
retained by and inherent in the people.

The right of every man

to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience
shall never be infringed; nor shall any man be compelled to
attend, erect or support any place of worship or to maintain any
religious or ecclesiastical ministry against his consent; nor
shall any control of or interference with the rights of
conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any
religious establishment or mode of worship; but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse
acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of the state, nor shall any money be drawn from
the treasury for the benefit of any religious societies or
religious or theological seminaries.
Religious tests and property qualifications prohibited.

No

religious test or amount of property shall be required as a
qualification for any office of public trust in the state.

No

religious test or amount of property shall be required as a
qualification of any voter at any election in this state; nor
shall any person be rendered incompetent to give evidence in any
court of law or equity in consequence of his opinion upon the
11

subject of religion."

MINN. CONST. Art. I, §§ 16-17.

22. "No religious test as a qualification for office shall
be required; and no preference shall be given by law to any
religious sect or mode of worship; but the free enjoyment of all
religious sentiments and the different modes of worship shall be
held sacred.

The rights hereby secured shall not be construed to

justify acts of licentiousness injurious to morals or dangerous
to the peace and safety of the state, or to exclude the Holy
Bible from use in any public school of this state."

MISS.

CONST. Art. IV, § 18.
23. "Religious freedom-liberty of conscience and belieflimitations. -That all men have a natural and indefeasible right
to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences; that no human authority can control or interfere
with the rights of conscience; that no person shall, on account
of his religious persuasion or belief, be rendered ineligible to
any public office or trust or profit in this state, be
disqualified from testifying or serving as a juror, or be
molested in his person or estate; but this section shall not be
construed to excuse acts of licentiousness, nor to justify
practices inconsistent with the good order, peace or safety of
the state, or with the rights of others.
Practice and support of religion not compulsory-contracts
therefor enforceable.-That no person can be compelled to erect,
support or attend any place or system of worship, or to maintain
or support any priest, minister, preacher or teacher of any sect,
12

church, creed or denomination of religion; but if any person
shall voluntarily make a contract for any such object, he shall
be held to the performance of the same.
Public aid for religious purposes-preferences and
discriminations on religious grounds.-That no money shall ever be
taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of
any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any
priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that
no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made
against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of
religious faith or worship."

MO. CONST. Art. I, §§ 5-7.

24. "All persons have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences.

No person shall be compelled to attend, erect or

support any place of worship against his consent, and no
preference shall be given by law to any religious society, nor
shall any interference with the rights of conscience be
permitted.

No religious test shall be required as a

qualification for office, nor shall any person be incompetent to
be a witness on account of his religious beliefs; but nothing
herein shall be constructed to dispense with oaths and
affirmations.

Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being

essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature to pass suitable laws to protect every religious
denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public
worship, and to encourage schools and the means of instruction."
13

NEB. CONST. Art. I, § 4.
25. "Liberty of conscience.

The free exercise and enjoyment

of religious profession and worship without discrimination or
preference shall forever be allowed in this State, and no person
shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his
opinions on matters of his religious belief, but the liberty of
consciene [conscience] hereby secured, shall not be so construed,
as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace, or safety of this State."

NEV.

CONST. Art. I, § 4.
26. "[Religious Freedom Recognized.]

Every individual has a

natural and unalienable right to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject shall
be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or
estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season most
agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his
religious profession, sentiments, or persuasion; provided he doth
not disturb the public peace or disturb others in their religious
worship."

N.H. CONST. § 5.

27. "No person shall be deprived of the inestimable
privilege of worshipping Almighty God in a manner agreeable to
the dictates of his own conscience; nor under any pretence
whatever be compelled to attend any place of worship contrary to
his faith and judgment; nor shall any person be obliged to pay
tithes, taxes, or other rates for building or repairing any
church or churches, place or places of worship, or for the
14

maintenance of any minister or ministry, contrary to what he
believes to be right or has deliberately and voluntarily engaged
to perform.
There shall be no establishment for one religious sect in
preference to another; no religious or racial test shall be
required as a qualification for any office or public trust.
No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or
military right, nor be discriminated against in the exercise of
any civil or military right, nor be segregated in the militia or
in the public schools, because of religious principles, race,
color, ancestry or national origin."

N.J. CONST. Art., I, §§ 3-

5.
28. "Every man shall be free to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience, and no person shall ever be
molested or denied any civil or political right or privilege on
account of his religious opinion or mode of religious worship.
No person shall be required to attend any place of worship or
support any religious sect or denomination; nor shall any
preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode
of worship."

N.M. CONST. Art. II, § 11.

29. "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever
be allowed in this state to all mankind; and no person shall be
rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions
on matters of religious belief; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
15

licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
or safety of this state."

N.Y. CONST. Art. I, § 3.

30. "Religious liberty.

All persons have a natural and

inalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the
dictates of their own consciences, and no human authority shall,
in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of
conscience."

N.C. CONST. Art. I, § 19.

31. "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference shall be
forever guaranteed in this state, and no person shall be rendered
incompetent to be a witness or juror on account of his opinion on
matters of religious belief; but the liberty of conscience hereby
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
or safety of this state."

N.D. CONST. Art. I, § 3.

32. "All men have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
conscience.

No person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or

support any place of worship, or maintain any form of worship,
against his consent; and no preference shall be given, by law, to
any religious society; nor shall any interference with the rights
of conscience be permitted.

No religious test shall be required,

as a qualification for office, nor shall any person be
incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious belief;
but nothing herein shall be construed to dispense with oaths and
affirmations.

Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being
16

essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the general
assembly to pass suitable laws to protect every religious
denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode of public
worship, and to encourage schools and the means of instruction."
OHIO CONST. Art. I, § 7.
33. "Perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be
secured, and no inhabitant of the State shall ever be molested in
person or property on account of his or her mode of religious
worship; and no religious test shall be required for the exercise
of civil or political rights.

Polygamous or plural marriages are

forever prohibited.
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system
of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary, or
sectarian institution as such."
34. "Freedom of worship.

OKLA. CONST. Art. II, §§ 2 & 5.

All men shall be secure in the

Natural right, to worship Almighty God according to the dictates
of their own consciences.
Freedom of religious opinion.

No law shall in any case

whatever control the free exercise, and enjoyment of religious
(sic) opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.
No religious qualification for office.

No religious test

shall be required as a qualification for any office of trust or
profit.
17

No money to be appropriated for religion.

No money shall be

drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of any religious (sic),
or theological institution, nor shall any money be appropriated
for the payment of any religious (sic) services in either house
of the Legislative Assemble.
No religious test for witnesses or jurors.

No person shall

be rendered incompetent as a witness, or juror in consequence of
his opinions on matters of religion (sic); nor be questioned in
any Court of Justice touching his religious (sic) belief to
affect the weight of his testimony."

OR. CONST. Art. I §§ 2-6.

35. "All men have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against
his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever,
control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no
preference shall ever be given by law to any religious
establishments or modes of worship.
No person who acknowledges the being of a God and a future
state of rewards and punishments shall, on account of his
religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place
of trust or profit under this Commonwealth."

PA. CONST. Art. I,

§§ 3-4.
36. "Religious freedom; freedom of speech; right of assembly
and petition.—The General Assembly shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
18

thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government or any department thereof for a redress of
grievances. "

S.C. CONST. Art. I, § 2.

37• "The right to worship God according to the dictates of
conscience shall never be infringed.

No person shall be denied

any civil or political right, privilege or position on account of
his religious opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse licentiousness,
the invasion of the rights of others, or justify practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state.
No person shall be compelled to attend or support any
ministry or place of worship against his consent nor shall any
preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode
of worship.

No money or property of the state shall be given or

appropriated for the benefit of any sectarian or religious
society or institution."

S.D. CONST. Art. VI, § 3.

38. "That all men have a natural and indefeasible right to
worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own
conscience; that no man can of right be compelled to attend,
erect, or support any place of worship, or to maintain any
minister against his consent; that no human authority can, in any
case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of
conscience; and that no preference shall ever be given, by law to
any religious establishment or mode or worship.
That no political or religious test, other than an oath to
19

support the Constitution of the United States and of this State,
shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public
trust under this State."

TENN. CONST. Art. I, §§ 3-4.

39. "No religious test shall ever be required as a
qualification to any office, or public trust, in this State; nor
shall any one be excluded from holding office on account of his
religious sentiments, provided he acknowledge the existence of a
Supreme Being.
No person shall be disqualified to give evidence in any of
the Courts of this State on account his religious opinions, or
for the want of any religious belief, but all oaths or
affirmations shall be administered in the mode most binding upon
the conscience, and shall be taken subject to the pains and
penalties of perjury.
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences.
No man shall be compelled to attend, erect or support any place
of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent.

No

human authority ought, in any case whatever, to control or
interfere with the rights of conscience in matters of religion,
and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious
society or mode of worship.

But it shall be the duty of the

Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect
equally every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment
of its own mode of public worship.
No money shall be appropriated, or drawn from the Treasury
20

for the benefit of any sect, or religious society, theological or
religious seminary; nor shall property belonging to the State be
appropriated for any such purposes."

TEX. CONST. Art. I, §§ 4-7.

40. "That all men have a natural and unalienable right, to
worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own
consciences and understandings, as in their opinion shall be
regulated by the word of God:

and that no man ought to, or of

right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect
or support any place of worship, or maintain any minister,
contrary to the dictates of his conscience, nor can any man be
justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on
account of his religious sentiments, or peculia[r] mode of
religious worship; and that no authority can, or ought to be
vested in, or assumed by, any power whatever, that shall in any
case interfere with, or in any manner control the rights of
conscience, in the free exercise of religious worship.
Nevertheless, every sect or denomination of Christians ought to
observe the Sabbath or Lord's day, and keep up some sort of
religious worship, which to them shall seem most agreeable to the
revealed will of God."

VT. CONST. Art. Ill, Chpt. 3.

41. "That religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator,
and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason
and conviction, not by force or violence; and, therefore, all men
are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according
to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of
all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards
21

each other.

No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any

religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, and shall be
enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or
goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief; but all men shall be free to profess and by
argument to maintain their opinions in matters of religion, and
the same shall in nowise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil
capacities.

And the General Assembly shall not prescribe any

religious test whatever, or confer any peculiar privileges or
advantages on any sect or denomination, or pass any law requiring
or authorizing any religious society, or the people of any
district within this Commonwealth, to levy on themselves or
others, any tax for the erection or repair of any house of public
worship, or for the support of any church or ministry; but it
shall be left free to every person to select his religious
instructor, and to make for his support such private contract as
he shall please." VA. CONST. Art. I, § 16.
42. "Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of
religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to
every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in
person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse
acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace and safety of the state. No public money or property shall
be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise
or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment:
22

Provided, however, That this article shall not be so construed as
to forbid the employment by the state of a chaplain for such of
the state custodial, correctional and mental institutions as in
the discretion of the legislature may seen justified.

No

religious qualification shall be required for any public office
or employment, nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness
or juror, in consequence of his opinion on matters of religion,
nor be questioned in any court of justice touching his religious
belief to affect the weight of his testimony."

WASH. CONST. Art.

I, § 11.
43. "No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever; nor shall any
man be enforced, restrained, molested or burthened, in his body
or goods, or otherwise suffer, on account of his religious
opinions or belief, but all men shall be free to profess and, by
argument, to maintain their opinions in matters of religion; and
the same shall, in nowise, affect, diminish or enlarge their
civil capacities; and the Legislature shall not prescribe any
religious test whatever, or confer any peculiar privileges or
advantages on any sect or denomination, or pass any law requiring
or authorizing any religious society, or the people of any
district within this State, to levy on themselves, or others, any
tax for the erection or repair of any house for public worship,
or for the support of any church or ministry, but it shall be
left free for every person to select his religious instructor,
and to make for his support such private contracts as he shall
23

please.
Public schools shall provide a designated brief time at the
beginning of each school day for any student desiring to exercise
their right to personal and private contemplation, meditation or
prayer.

No student of a public school may be denied the right to

personal and private contemplation, meditation or prayer nor
shall any student be required or encouraged to engage in any
given contemplation, meditation or prayer as part of the school
curriculum."

W.VA. CONST. Art. Ill, § 15.

44. "The right of every person to worship Almighty God
according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed;
nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any
place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent;
nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of
conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any
religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any money
be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious
societies, or religious or theological seminaries.
No religious tests shall ever be required as a qualification
for any office of public trust under the state, and no person
shall be rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of
law or equity in consequence of his opinions on the subject of
religion."

WIS. CONST. Art. I, §§ 18-19.

45. "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship without discrimination or preference shall be forever
guaranteed in this state, and no person shall be rendered
24

incompetent to hold any office of trust or profit, or to serve as
a witness or juror, because of his opinion on any matter of
religious belief whatsoever; but the liberty of conscience hereby
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace
or safety of the state.
Appropriations for sectarian or religious societies or
institutions prohibited.-No money of the state shall ever be
given or appropriated to any sectarian or religious society or
instruction."

WYO. CONST. Art. I, §§ 18-19.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
INC., a Maryland non-profit
corporation; RICHARD ANDREWS;
and J, WALKER,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO.

910906136

Plaintiffs,
vs,
RON WHITEHEAD, WAYNE HORROCKS,
NANCY PACE, ALAN HARDMAN, TOM
GODFREY, ROSELYN KIRK and
TOM HALE, Members Salt Lake
Cizy Council,
Defendants.

The parties have filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment
in the instant action.

Plaintiffs seek a declaration from this

Court that: the City Council's practice of

including, for a

number of stated secular purposes, a prayer as part_ of its
opening

ceremonies, violates

Article

I,

Section

4

of

the

Constitution of the State of Utah.
This Cour-c, on January 13, 1992, granted the Motion for
Leave to File Amicus 3rief on behalf of the American Civil
Liberties union Foundation of Utah, Inc.
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Oral

arguments

on

PAGE 2

the

respective
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motions

were

heard

February 21, 1991.

OPERATIVE FACTS
1.
and

The 1911 Utah State Legislature merged the legislative

executive

functions

of

commission form of government.

the

city

government

into

a

Prayer was not usually offered

during these meetings for the years 1911 through 1979.
2.

In 1930, pursuant to Title 10-3-1701, et seq. , Utah

Code Ann., 1953, Salt Lake City adopted
Mayor form of government.
separates

the

executive

the

Council-Strong

This form of government: strictly
and

legislarive

functions.

The

executive functions are carried out solely by the mayor, with
the legislarive functions reserved to the City Council.
3.

At its first meeting on January

Council decided

to open the meeting with

3, 1930, the City
a ceremony which

included the Pledge of Allegiance and a prayer.

From January

15, 198 0 until October 15, 1987, the proceedings of the City
Council reflect that a prayer or invocation was usually offered
at the beginning of each weekly legislative meeting.
4.

In a letter dated September 23, 1937, Assistant City

Attorney Ray Montgomery offered an opinion to the City Council
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that pursuant
opening

to

Marsh

ceremonies

v.
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Chambers, 463

including

U.S. 733

prayerful

(1983),

invocations

were

constitutionally permissible.
5.

Beginning

on

May

17,

1988,

the

City

Council

reinstituted the practice of including prayers as part of the
opening ceremonies of the Council meetings.

Prayers were not

said before the Salt Lake City Council from October 15, 1987
through May 17, 1983.

Defendants acknowledge that the practice

of the City Council from 1980 to 1987 was to have prayers and
invocations.
6.

On

October

17,

1991,

the

Salt

Lake

City

Council

adopted the Opening Ceremony Policy by a vote of 5 to 2.
7.

The formally adopted City Council Policy provides that

as part of an opening ceremony, the City Council will hear
various thoughts, readings and invocations prior to beginning
certain legislative sessions.

Contrary to the formally* adopted

City Council Policy, at least two of the defendant City Council
members acknowledge that prayers and invocations before the
City Council have always been offered and will continue to be
offered for religious purposes.

Yet, the City Council Policy

specifies that the offering of these thoughts, readings and
invocations

is

for

a

number

of

secular

ourooses.

These

SEPARATIONISTS V, WHITEHEAD
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specified secular purposes include the provision of a moment
during which the Council members and the audience can reflect
on

the

business

before

the

Council;

the

promotion

of

an

atmosphere of civility; the encouragement of lofty thought and
high-mindedness; the recognition of cultural diversity; and the
fostering of sensitivity for and recognition of the uniqueness
of all segments of our community,
8.

The

Council

non-denominational
presentations.

Policy

and

expresses

a

non-proselyting

Presentation

of

the

preference

opening

opening

the

ceremony

ceremony

coordinated by the Salt Lake City Police Chaplain.

to

give

their

opening

is

Pursuant to

Policy, anyone not contacted by the Chaplain

arrangements

for

can make

presentation.

The

presenters are not compensated in any way.
9.

Salt Lake City employee, Ed Snow, spent two days in

the fall of 1990 making telephone calls to sign up people that
would

offer

indicated

prayers

that

at

the

the City has

City
an

Council

extensive

meetings.
mailing

He

list of

churches which was used to invite religious leaders to contact
the City to offer prayers.
10.
City

Defendant Council member Godfrey acknowledges that the

Council's

desire

and

goal

prayers has not been successful.

to

have

non-denominational
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Defendant Council member Nancy Pace on October 17,

1991 stated with regard to the defendant's recently enacted
Policy regarding prayer before City Council meetings, "I don't
believe

that what

we're

doing

[offering

prayers] could

be

construed as secular and I don't believe that would hold up in
court.fl
12-

On September

10, 1991, the Salt Lake City Council

allowed the recitation of the following prayer by the Chaplain
of the Salt Lake City Police Department:
Our Father in Heaven, we are grateful this
night to be able to meet in this forum and
we ask Thee to bless those who participate,
that their minds will be clear and decisions
will be made that will be fair and equitable
to the citizens of the City.
We are
grateful
for
our
government.
We are
grateful for the land we hold. Father, we
are graceful for the safe return of our
troops
from the Gulf.
We ask these
blessings in the name of Jesus Christ. Amen.
13.

Although requested orally and in writing to cease said

practice, the defendants have declined to do so.
14.

Defendants

admit

chat

"existing

city

facilities,

assets and a small amount of time" are used in conducting the
invocations.
results

in

The inclusion of prayers in City Council meetings
the

expenditure

of

public

funds,

assets

and

SEPARATIONISTS V. WHITEHEAD

resources

of

Salt

Lake

PAGE 6

City

Corporation.

(meeting rooms, etc.)/

City equipment

stages,

resources

etc.),

programs,

City

etc.),

attending,

and

etc.),

are

used

and

City

facilities

(microphones, padiums,

(electricity,

employees7

City
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time

expended

witnessing and/or reciting said prayers.

printing

of

(in supervising,
in

programming,

Said funds, assets

and resources of Salt Lake City Corporation are utilized to aid
in the recitation of said prayers with the knowledge, approval,
concurrence and ratification of the defendants.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs

have

sought

Summary

Judgment

against

the

defendants seeking to enjoin the presentation of prayers and
invocations as part of the Salt Lake City Council meetings in
that the same constitutes an expenditure and appropriation by
defendants

of

funds

and

resources

in

violation "of

the

prohibitory provisions of Article I, Section 4 of the Utah
Constitution.

Specifically, it is argued the Utah Constitution

establishes the right of citizens to have no public money spent
on a religious exercise, ~he right to a government free of
sectarian

influence or control, and the

their own religious

ideas

free of state

right to entertain
intrusions.

These
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guarantees of religious autonomy and absolute

separation

of

church and state explicitly go beyond those protections offered
by the United States Constitution.

In expanding the rights of

its citizens, the Utah Constitution it is argued, distinctly
and

separately

rejects

the

practice

of

praying

before

legislative meetings.
Defendants have responded by arguing that notwithstanding
the differences in the language of the Utah Constitution to
that of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
this Court shourd decide the issue presented the way it has
been decided by rhe United Srates Supreme Court in the matter
of Marsh

v. Chambers,

traditional

prayers

463

are,

U.S.

733

under

(1983),

specified

in

that

such

circumstances,

acceptable under the First Amendment and do not constitute an
establishment of religion.

It is argued by the defendants that

the offering of non-denominational, non-proselyting prayers for
specified

secular

purposes

at

"legislative11

sessions

is

acceptable under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of
Utah.

Furthermore,

it

is argued,

rhe

expenditures

are

de

minimus.
Article I, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution in pertinent
parr declares:
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The rights of conscience shall never be
infringed.
The state shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof;. . .
There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State, or
interfere with its functions.
No public
money or property shall be appropriated for
or
applied
to
any
religious
worship,
exercise or instruction, or for the support
of any ecclesiastical establishment. . . .
No

prior

Utah

Supreme

Court

cases

have

specifically

interpreted the foregoing constitutional provision insofar as
it relates to the exercise or the allowance of prayers and/or
invocations at city council or legislative meetings.

Moreover,

none of the cases cited by counsel are specifically on point.
However, while not of precedential value, it is instructive to
examine

decisions

from

other

state

courts

which

have

interpreted comparable provisions of their own constitutions.
Article I, Section 5, of the Oregon Constitution states:
No money shall be drawn from the treasury
for the benefit of any religeous [sic] or
theological institution, nor shall any money
be appropriated for the payment of any
religeous [sic] services in either house of
the Legislative assembly.
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by

the

Oregon

Court

of

Appeals in the matter of Kav v. Douglas School District, 719
P.2d

875

(Or.App. 1986).

prohibition

The Oregon court

interpreted

of public expenditure on religious

the

institutions

strictly, finding it applicable even though a teacher in a
public school had scheduled to read a prayer on volunteered
time.

The court held, as follows:
The fact that money spent on the preparation
and delivery of the invocation was not
apportioned and identified as a "line item"
in the budget does not take it out of the
proscription of Section 5, which prohibits
the spending of any money for the benefit
of any religious or theological institution.
Id. at 873. (Emphasis original)

In the matter of Sands v. Moroncro Unified School District,
309

P.2d

809,

at

836

(Cal.

1991),

three

members

of

the

California Supreme Court determined that governmental support
and endorsement of graduation prayers violated both the state
and federal constitutions.
They refused to find the supposed "sectarian" nature of the
prayers

acceptable,

unconstitutional

insisting

thar

a

practice

is

"when it appears to place the government's

stamp of approval on a particular type of religious practice,
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Article XVI, Section 5,

of the California Constitution provides:
Neither the Legislature, nor any county,
city and county, township, school district,
or other municipal corporation, shall ever
make an appropriation, or pay from any
public fund whatever, or grant anything to
or in aid of any religious sect, church,
creed, or sectarian purpose. . . •
Judge Mosk, concurring, stated that, "[SJtate courts are
and

should

be,

liberties. ..."

the
Id.

first
at

line

836.

of

Two

defense

additional

for

individual

judges

of

the

California Supreme Court having concurred in the finding that
the

practice

United

involved

violated

the

States Constitution, declined

First

Amendment

to reach

the

of

the

issue of

whether or not the practice involved violated the California
Constitution.

The remaining two judges determined there was no

violation.
Clearly, the pertinent provisions in the Utah Constitution
in question, have no counterparts in the federal constitution,
and are not intended to be restricted by interpretations of the
United States Constitution.

Instead, as asserted by the Utah

Supreme Court, the srate constitution embodies certain of the
provisions of the federal constitution, and then expands and
expounds on these in greater detail:
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[Pjrovision of Section 4, Article I, of the
Utah Constitution. . . is more articulate
and express in assuring religious liberty
and prohibiting discrimination, or church
interference with private or public rights,
than the generality of the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution.
Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549, at
552 (Utah 1973) (Crockett, J., concurring).
One scholar has observed:
Compared
to the brief and almost
enigmatic statement on religion in the
federal
constitution,
the
Utah
constitution's
provisions
seem
prolix
indeed. Almost every imaginable protection
for religious freedom and injunction against
the union of church and state has been
included.
[T]he union of church and state is
expressly prohibited. . . and appropriations
of public money or property
to
"any
religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical
establishment" are proscribed.
Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State
Constitution, Utah L.Rev. 326, at 331 (1965).
One of the principal, if not the first canon of statutory
or constitutional construction is that if the language of a
statute or constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous,
examination of legislative intent is unnecessary.

In Rampton

v. Barlow. 464 P.2d 378 (Utah 1970), the Supreme Court held
that if the language of a statute or constitutional provision
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in a statute...or a Constitution, the first
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signification of the words..-, If the words
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absurdity, nor any contradiction of other
parts of the instrument, then that meaning,
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Defendant s cross Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
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Invites Divisive Religious Assault
By Alfred C. Emery
and John J. Flynn
FOR THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE

It is with deep concern that we
write about what is likely to become a most divisive time for the
people of Utah. There is a headlong rush to amend the Utah Constitution to enable local governments to introduce their meetings
with prayer. In order to accomplish this objective, amendment
proponents are seeking the removal of language unique to
Utah's Constitution to make it
conform with the language of the
United States Constitution.
It should be noted that there is
no guarantee that local government prayers are constitutional
under the federal Constitution,
because that issue has not been
directly decided by the United
States Supreme Court,
In any event, the language
which would need to be removed
from the Utah Constitution to
conform it with the federal includes the clauses which provide:
1. "The rights of conscience shall
never be infringed"; 2. "There
shall be no union of church and
state"; 3. "Nor shall any church
dominate the state or interfere
with its functions" and, 4. "No
public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to
any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or for the support of
any ecclesiastical establishment."
The reason this extensive list of
prohibitions was placed in the
Utah Constitution was the fear
that a state overwhelmingly made
up of citizens of one faith and a
state with the unique history of
being established by the members
of one faith fleeing unjust persecution elsewhere would become a
theocracy — a state where the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints and the state government would become one in fact
because of the overwhelming
number of citizens being members of the LDS faith.
The central fear was that members of minority religions and
those with no religious beliefs
would be excluded from effective
participation in the governing of
the state and that the rights of the
minority would be ignored by the
LDS majority and the state government that majority dominated. Church policy, it was believed,
would control state government
indirectly, if not directly, by virtue of church members holding
most of the elective and appointive offices of government and that
those members would naturally
vote or exercise their religious
views without the need for express church direction.
Those fears remain today and
are reinforced when an issue like
eliminating the express prohibitions upon religious involvement
with government from the Utah
Constitution is proposed. These
fears are not unjustified paranoia
for non-Mormons confronted by
domination of most of the elective
and appointive public institutions
around them by members of the

ments, school boards and schools
to all three branches of the state
government, and the elective offices to the national government.
Non-Mormon fears of church
domination of and use of state
power become reinforced by obvious denominational influence on
public issues like liquor control,
parimutuel betting, regulations of
wineries, abortion regulation and
the writing and rewriting of sexual education manuals for public
schools.
If the Legislature places an
amendment on the November ballot to remove the constitutional
barriers to undue church or denominational influence upon and
domination of state government,
it may well be on the ballot with a
proposal to overturn a church-influenced vote in the Legislature
refusing to sanction parimutuel
betting on horse races. Paradoxically, voters may be asked to approve a law defeated by church
influence on the Legislature and
— at the same time — be asked to
amend the State Constitution's
prohibitions upon undue church
influence upon state government
on the same ballot.
Whatever the merit of these individual actions is beside the larger point we wish to make. All the
elements are present for a bitter
and divisive split along religious
lines by a vote to repeal important
limitations protecting minority
rights in the Utah Constitution.
Eliminating those guarantees will
not only present the spectacle of
overturning individual rights by
majority vote, but will also reinforce the belief by many who do
not belong to the dominant religion in this state that they are not
welcome and have no say in government or public affairs in this
state. The longstanding and unfortunate division between Mormon and non-Mormon will only be
accentuated and possibly be made
irrevocable.
Aside from the obvious risks
for future economic development, tourism and efforts to attract outside businesses to Utah,
such a state of affairs will do
great long-term injury to one and
all — both Mormon citizens and
non-Mormon citizens of this state
who have much to learn from one
another. We should be looking for
ways to bring the people of this
state together, not driving them
further apart by premature votes
on amending the state's Constitution
The emotional rush to amend
the Utah Constitution should be
brought to a halt, so cooler minds
may prevail and an assessment of
the long-term harm to this state
and the ability of all its peoples to
live peacefully and respectfully
together can be made. We should
await a final decision by the Utah
Supreme Court on the issue of
prayers by local governments before taking any action drastically
amending the Utah Constitution.
In the interim, local governments should consider an f ierna-

interests of people of all religious
persuasions and those with none.
A moment of silence for personal
reflection in all public meetings
and in the Legislature can satisfy
the needs of those who need to
pray for divine guidance, and
each can do it in their own way. A
moment of silence might also
cause those who see no need for
divine guidance to reflect upon
why they so believe or to think
more deeply about the issues they
are about to discuss.
In this way, time to reflect
about amending the Constitution
may be gained so that we may all
consider more seriously the obligations of the majority to the minority in matters of conscience;
the role of lawmakers to reflect
more seriously upon the obligation of their role to serve the best
interests of all citizens and not
just those who share their personal moral and religious beliefs; and
the wisdom of the parable of the
Pharisees and the Publicans with
respect to the use of power to
force others to listen to one's
prayers may be more fully appreciated.
Those who object to the moment of silence in favor of public
prayers at governmental meetings should ponder why it is that
they insist upon the use of governmental power to force all those
participating in a public meeting
to listen to the prayers being offered in lieu of each person offering their own prayer silently. If
that reason is that a majority
should have the right to force a
minority to conform to the majority's will or recognize its power in
this most sensitive area of individual conscience, then we are confronting a fundamental attack
upon the very idea of a Bill of
Rights. The purpose of constitutional guarantees of individual
rights is to remove certain rights
from popular vote and to guarantee those rights of each individual
against the majority's will and
power.
If there is one group in America
who should appreciate this most
fundamental purpose of constitutional guarantees of individual
liberties, it is the heirs of the Mormon pioneers, whose basic rights
to freedom of religion and conscience were grossly violated by
the majority in Illinois and Missouri. The basic denial of their individual rights drove the pioneers
on their long and dangerous journey to settle in Utah.
If the Utah Constitution is
amended to ensure that the majority's will overrides the rights of
a minority in matters of conscience and the right to be free
from the use of governmental
power to be forced to conform to
majority religious beliefs, the
paradox will be one of the great
paradoxes of the American experience and generate an unfortunate, painful and divisive debate
we do not need in Utah.
Alfred C. Emery and John J.
Flynn are University of Utah pro-

